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1962/11/30

Approved in S 12/5/62

.Memo No.5

November 30, 1962 1:00 - 3:40 p.m.

Berlin

The United States:

The Secretary

OSD

The Under Secretary

Ambassador Thompson

Mr. Richard H. Davis, EUR

Mr. Kamman, Interpreter

The Soviet Union:

First Dep. Premier Anastas Mikoyan

Ambassador Dobrynin

Mr. Kornienko, Counselor, Sov. Emb.

Mr. Chistov

Mr. Vinogradov, Interpreter

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Turning from the discussion on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mr. Mikoyan said he had another question to raise. The Cuban question, he observed, could have brought us to nuclear war, but now the crucial period was over and we should be able to settle this question peacefully. ever, there was a second question which could lead us to war, and this is Germany. We have consulted with, and submitted many proposals to our World War II Allies. Two or three years have passed during which there have been extensive negotiations with Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko. This has brought about considerable progress. When Mr. Dulles complained about the Soviet ultimatum of six months in the first Soviet proposal on Germany and said it could not possibly be worked out in this time, the Soviet Union had not insisted. Moreover, it was not an ultimatum. limit is not as important for us as the willingness of our World War II Allies to finalize this question. Looking back, we do not regret postponing the issue because in our discussions certain progress has been made.

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The Soviet Union could not, Mr. Mikoyan continued. go beyond the proposals already made by Chairman Khrush-The Soviet Union was concerned by the presence of Western troops in Berlin. He would like to ask a question: since the Western powers were not making new proposals, or apparently making any constructive efforts, did the United States think that this situation could be frozen in perpetuity? Did the United States expect the occupation forces to remain in West Berlin for all time? these questions were legitimate but the United States did not answer them. If the Soviet Union became convinced that their World War II Allies don't want an agreement, then the Soviet Union would proceed alone. It did not wish to do so but we could not live together with an occupation regime in West Berlin and no peace treaty. However, Mr. Mikoyan concluded, he would not repeat the thoughts in Chairman Khrushchev's messages to the President on this subject.

The Secretary stated that we had had many discussions in the past but he was glad to tell Mr. Mikoyan of our position. In the course of these past discussions a number of points had arisen on which considerable progress had been made. We had tried to meet the USSR in a spirit or reciprocity. Now we have come to a point where in trying to meet the Soviet Union on one point, it is then set aside and the USSR moves on to another point. frankness, more genuine reciprocity from the Soviet side is needed. For example, we were told East Berlin cannot be discussed, i.e., Allied interests in East Berlin are not for discussion. We were told we must discuss West Berlin. This position reflects an absence of the spirit of reciprocity. We have said for years that the presence of Western troops and a guaranteed freedom for Berlin is a vital interest of the United States. We haven't said

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
that this situation will be perpetuated for eternity. We would like to see a peace treaty for all Germany and we have made many proposals, but we are faced with the fact of disagreement between us.

Mr. Mikoyan asked on what basis did the United States intend to keep its troops in West Berlin and for how long.

The Secretary responded that time limits were difficult to talk about except in terms of a general settlement of the German question. At this point there is a sharp difference between the Soviet Union and the United States. This can be managed so as not to produce other crises while we proceed to other questions which might help our relations. In this way time can be of help, and in the long run will improve the possibilities of agreement. Also the time factor can be affected by relations between the East and West Germans, for instance, in the matter of trade, which would indicate they were prepared to live in peace. Again time would be a factor when the West Berliners no longer have the threat of a man with opinions and objectives like Ulbricht hanging over them.


The Secretary continued that our approach had been broadly along three lines: First, to settle the German question as a whole, which would mean the end of the occupation; secondly, recognizing existing facts, of which there are three important elements -- the existence of East Germany, West Germany and West Berlin; thirdly, given the fact of disagreement, we must consider how we might manage this problem in order to promote the possibilities of agreement in the long run, but handle the fact of disagreement peacefully. This was one of the reasons why we had proposed Deputy Foreign Ministers. Unfortunately, we had not been able to reach agreement on any of these three variants. Both of our countries possess great power and Berlin was important to both. Therefore we must prepare to discuss the question with great care. We feel that if the Soviet approach is the same, we can find a way to deal with this issue.





Mr. Mikoyan said the Secretary's last remark was constructive and he entirely shared it. With many of the Secretary's past remarks he could not agree. Berlin was situated in the territory of the GDR. Berlin is the capital city of a sovereign state. cordingly, by all the rules, West Berlin should be considered a part of the GDR, and it could have claimed West Berlin. But the USSR and the GDR, understanding the position of the Western Powers, had agreed that West Berlin remain a special unit without becoming part of the GDR. There was no intention to interfere with West Berlin unless it became a member of military pacts. The Soviet Union had agreed to talk with the United States on how to finish the occupation status. It would be much better if a peace treaty were signed by all the Allies against Germany in World War II, but if this were not possible, because of the stubbornness of Adenauer or other Western Allies, the Soviet Union could sign a separate treaty. But the Soviet Union would prefer to find an agreed solution. Time does settle questions, but time can also create contradictions and explosions can occur. The Berlin and German questions have been delayed for a long time but such delay makes the situation more dangerous. The United States should give more thought to its position but it should not delay too long.

The Secretary said we were prepared to go into this question at any time. If there was introduced an element of genuine reciprocity, he thought a solution could be found. However, he felt that we had had agreements in the past on questions with the USSR but these agreements haven't lasted very long. In this connection the Secretary referred to the 1945 agreements when Allied troops had withdrawn from a considerable portion of East Germany, and to the 1949 agreements which through certain events we felt had been violated to some degree. The United States wants





to remove Berlin and Germany as a constant source of difficulties, but we must recognize the difficulty in finding a solution.

The Secretary said he wanted to comment on Mr. Mikoyan's remark about delay. The United States is not attempting to delay discussions. The delays which have occurred are bilateral responsibility. One can always hurry into a crisis, but it is much better if we can find a way to resolve this question without a crisis. The Secretary said he was confident that he could speak for President Kennedy in that he wants to find a satisfactory solution to this issue. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have many other things to do for their peoples.

Mr. Mikoyan responded that in order to find an end to this issue, questions must be discussed. The President should not expect from the Soviet Union additional proposals. The Soviet Union expects constructive proposals from the United States.

The Secretary observed the United States had made quite a few proposals but received the reply that these could not be discussed.

Mr. Mikoyan said it was really the other way around and urged that the United States think the situation over. The Soviet Union believes that there must be movement ahead. Mr. Mikoyan disclaimed any intention of conducting negotiations, but he wanted the Secretary to understandthe seriousness of this issue for the USSR.

The Secretary expressed the hope that Moscow would give a great deal of thought to this issue; indeed all of the Powers concerned must give hard thought to it.

Referring

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Referring to Mr. Mikoyan's remark about Adenauer, the Secretary emphasized that the United States was not speaking on behalf of our Allies or their interest, but rather of the vital interests of the United States. It would be a great mistake to think the United States was paralyzed or tongue-tied by the attitude of one or more of its Allies. The United States still hoped that progress could be made on this issue.

Mr. Mikoyan jokingly remarked "so there is an independent policy of the United States". He concluded by remarking that Soviet interests and ours could be reconciled, which was a good omen.

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